Evaluating cost and profit efficiency: a comparison of parametric and nonparametric methodologies by Delis, Manthos D et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Evaluating cost and profit efficiency: a
comparison of parametric and
nonparametric methodologies
Manthos D Delis and Anastasia Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and
Christos Staikouras and Katerina Gerogiannaki
8. January 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14039/
MPRA Paper No. 14039, posted 13. March 2009 06:16 UTC
 Evaluating cost and profit efficiency: A comparison of parametric 
and non-parametric methodologies 
 
 
Manthos D. Delis a,*, Anastasia Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki b, Christos K. 
Staikouras b
 
a Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of 
Economics and Business, 76 Patission St, Athens 10434, Greece 
b Department of Accounting and Finance, Athens University of Economics and Business, 
76 Patission Street, 10434, Athens, Greece 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper's objective is twofold. First it provides an empirical assessment of the cost and 
profit stochastic frontiers based on a panel dataset of Greek commercial banks over the 
1993-2005 period. Second, on the basis of the same sample, it also compares the most 
widely used parametric and non-parametric techniques to cost efficiency measurement, 
namely the Stochastic Frontier Approach and Data Envelopment Analysis. The results 
suggest greater similarities between the predictions of cost and profit efficiency methods 
than between parametric and non-parametric techniques. Such evidence is new in the 
literature and calls for a more technically level playing field for estimating bank 
efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
The investigation of bank efficiency has fuelled a large body of literature globally, 
and is of vital importance from both a microeconomic and a macroeconomic point of 
view (Berger and Mester, 1997). From the micro perspective this issue is crucial given 
the enhancement of competition, and the improvements in the institutional, regulatory 
and supervisory framework. From the macro perspective, the efficiency of the banking 
industry influences the cost of financial intermediation, and the overall stability of 
financial markets. Indeed, an improvement in bank performance indicates a better 
allocation of financial resources, and therefore an increase in investment that favors 
growth. 
While a thorough search of the literature would reveal hundreds of studies 
quantifying the efficiency of financial institutions, there have been surprisingly few 
attempts to compare cost and profit efficiency measures, and even fewer to evaluate the 
alternative techniques of efficiency measurement. Regarding the former issue, and as 
previous efficiency studies stress out, a bank may pursue many goals. However, profit 
efficiency is naturally its ultimate goal, while cost efficiency is an important means of 
reaching long-run profit efficiency. Yet, Berger and Mester (1997) showed that profit 
efficiency may not be positively correlated with cost efficiency, suggesting that the 
measure of profit efficiency may include output features that reflect higher quality or 
greater market power in pricing. Differently phrased, an estimated cost function may 
incorporate much different information than a respective cost part of the estimated profit 
equation. 
Concerning the latter issue, the efficiency measurement techniques are based on 
either parametric or non-parametric frontiers. The parametric methods involve the 
estimation of an economic function (e.g., production, cost or profit) and the derivation of 
efficiency scores from either the residuals or dummy variables. In contrast, the non-
parametric methods involve solving linear programs, in which an objective function 
envelops the observed data; then efficiency scores are derived by measuring how far an 
observation is positioned from the “envelope” or frontier. 
Given the above, the aim of this study is twofold. First, it evaluates, in terms of a 
stochastic frontier approach, both the cost and profit efficiency of the banking system of a 
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medium-sized country like Greece, over the period 1993-2005. Naturally, a comparison 
of the two methods follows. In addition, this paper proposes an examination of the effect 
of certain inter-industry factors (such as bank size and ownership status) on efficiency 
that may suggest differences in the predictions provided by the two schemes. The 
conclusions drawn could inter alia prove useful for the comparison of the cost and profit 
structures of the banking sectors of other medium-sized economies that currently undergo 
structural changes in the direction of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and 
privatizations.  
Second, this study adds to the limited literature that compares the cost efficiency 
results derived from the two most widely used approaches to bank efficiency 
measurement, namely the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), a parametric method, and 
data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric method. The rationale for using two 
different methods is well described by Berger and Humphrey (1997), who suggest that 
policy and research issues that rely upon firm-level efficiency estimates may be more 
convincingly addressed if more than one frontier technique is applied to the same set of 
data to demonstrate the robustness of the explanatory results obtained. In other words, 
while each of the two approaches nurtures its own theoretical discourse, they should not 
be viewed as mutually exclusive but, more eclectically, as complementary methods. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a background of the 
efficiency measurement concepts and Section 3 outlines the methodologies to be used. 
Section 4 presents some stylized facts about the Greek banking system and describes the 
dataset. Section 5 presents the empirical results and compares them on the basis of the 
various methodologies used. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Efficiency measurement concepts 
Our focus in this article is on frontier efficiency (also called X-efficiency in the 
economic literature), in other words on the distance (in terms of production, cost, revenue 
or profit) of a Decision Making Unit (DMU) from the best-practice equivalent. This is 
given by a scalar measure ranging between zero (the lowest efficiency measure) and one 
(corresponding to the optimum DMU). Farrel (1957), suggested that the efficiency of a 
DMU consists of two components: technical efficiency, which reflects the ability of a 
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DMU to maximize output given a set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, which reflects 
the ability of a DMU to use the given set of inputs in optimal proportions, assuming input 
prices and technology are known. In this context, the product of technical and allocative 
efficiency provides a measure of overall economic efficiency.1 The focus of this article is 
on technical efficiency, hereafter plainly referred to as efficiency.2, 3 The literature on the 
measurement of efficiency is divided into two major approaches that use either 
parametric or non-parametric frontiers. To serve our purpose we refer to the various 
techniques used to measure efficiency by indicating only the main lines of methodology. 
In the parametric frontier analysis the technology of a DMU is specified by a 
particular functional form for the cost, profit or production relationship that links the 
DMU’s output to input factors. The most widely applied technique is the stochastic 
frontier approach (SFA). Under the SFA, the error term is split into two components, 
allowing for both random effects and X-inefficiencies, where the random effects usually 
follow a normal distribution and the inefficiencies a truncated normal distribution.4 An 
important drawback of the parametric approaches is that they impose a particular 
functional form (and hence all its associated behavioral assumptions), which 
predetermines the shape of the frontier. If the functional form is misspecified, the 
estimated efficiency may be confounded with significant bias. Popular functional forms 
include the Cobb-Douglas and the translog specifications, each having their own 
advantages and disadvantages (for a discussion see Coelli et al., 2005).  
The nonparametric approaches to efficiency measurement include the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Free Disposal Hull (FDH). DEA is a programming 
technique that provides a linear piecewise frontier by enveloping the observed data 
                                                 
1 For more technical definitions of these concepts see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
2 It is certainly erroneous to refer to technical efficiency simply as efficiency. However, we follow the 
majority of the literature that clearly does so to ease the discussion.  
3 Estimation of allocative efficiency is relatively easy under a non-parametric approach but is notoriously 
difficult under a parametric approach due to the problem referred in the literature as the ‘Greene problem’. A 
solution to this problem is offered by Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) and Brissimis et al. (2006), however 
such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present study. 
4 The distribution-free approach (DFA) makes no assumptions about the distribution of the x-inefficiency and 
the idiosyncratic error terms, since it treats DMU-level efficiency as a time constant. The thick-frontier 
approach (TFA) provides a general level of overall efficiency, not specific to each DMU. It calculates two 
frontiers, one for the quartile of DMUs with the lowest average performance and one for the quartile of DMUs 
with the highest average performance. Then, inefficiency is measured as the difference between the upper and 
the lower frontier. The x-inefficiency and the idiosyncratic error separation remains, yet no other distributional 
assumptions are made on the error terms (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
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points, yielding a convex production possibilities set. As such, it does not require the 
explicit specification of the functional form of the underlying production relationship. 
The Free Disposal Hull approach (FDH) is a special case of DEA, where, instead of 
convexity, free disposability of inputs and outputs is assumed. Because the FDH frontier 
is either congruent with or interior to the DEA frontier, FDH will typically generate 
larger estimates of average efficiency compared to DEA (Tulkens, 1993). Both 
approaches permit efficiency to vary over time and make no prior assumption regarding 
the form of the distribution of inefficiencies across observations (except that the best-
practice firms are 100% efficient).  
Even though they account for the main problem of the stochastic frontier methods, 
namely the arbitrary imposition of a specific functional form, the non-parametric methods 
have some pitfalls of their own. Most importantly they do not permit for random error 
and, as such, noise can cause severe problems in misleadingly shaping and positioning 
the frontier. Furthermore, tests of hypotheses regarding the existence of inefficiency and 
also regarding the structure of the production technology cannot be performed with 
DEA.5  
A comparison between DEA and SFA in banking has been offered by Ferrier and 
Lovell (1990), Eisenbeis et al. (1997), Resti (1997), and Huang and Wang (2002). The 
first three studies reported fairly close average efficiencies generated by the two 
approaches, while the latter suggests that the congruency between the results of the two 
methodologies is rather limited.6 Resti (1997) and Eisenbeis et al. (1997) found very high 
rank-order correlations between DEA and SFA, whereas Ferrier and Lovell (1990) found 
rank-order correlation of only 0.02 (not significantly different from zero). Also, in the 
most recent study, Huang and Wang (2002), using a panel of Taiwanese commercial 
banks, report that parametric and non-parametric methods are generally contradictory in 
ranking the sample banks based on their estimated efficiency scores. In contrast, 
Eisenbeis et al. (1997) found that while the calculated programming inefficiency scores 
derived from the DEA approach are two to three times larger than those estimated using a 
                                                 
5 For a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of each methodology see Coelli et al. (2005). 
6 A potential problem is that the level of efficiency under DEA may be sensitive to “self-identifiers” when 
there are too few observations relative to the number of constraints in DEA. In particular, Ferrier and Lovell 
(1990) found that the average efficiency level rose from 54% to 83% when constraints on number of branches 
and firm size were added to the model. 
 5
stochastic frontier, the correlation of the rankings of banks based on their efficiencies 
under the two methods is also relatively high. The inconclusive evidence of these studies 
clearly calls for additional research on this issue. 
Another fundamental decision in measuring efficiency is which concept to use, 
which, of course, depends on the question being addressed (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
There are three main economic efficiency concepts, namely cost, standard profit, and 
alternative profit efficiency, which are based on economic optimization in reaction to 
market prices and competition.7 Cost efficiency gives a measure of how close a bank’s 
cost is to what a best practice bank’s cost would be for producing the same output bundle 
under the same conditions. It is derived from a cost function in which variable costs 
depend on the prices of variable inputs, the quantities of variable outputs and any fixed 
inputs or outputs. Similarly, standard profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to 
producing the maximum possible profit given a particular level of input and output prices 
(and maybe other variables as well). In contrast to the cost function, the standard profit 
function specifies variable profits in place of variable costs, and takes variable output 
prices as given, rather than holding all output quantities statistically fixed at their 
observed, possibly inefficient levels. That is, the profit dependent variable allows for the 
consideration of revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as well as inputs. Thus, 
profit efficiency accounts for errors on the output side as well as those on the input side, 
and as some prior evidence suggests, inefficiencies on the output side may be equally 
large or larger than those on the input side (e.g. Berger et al., 1993). Hence, standard 
profit efficiency may take better account of overall technical efficiency than the cost 
efficiency measure. 
Alternative profit efficiency may be helpful when some of the assumptions 
underlying cost and standard profit efficiency are not met. Within this framework, 
efficiency is measured by how close a bank comes to earning maximum profits given its 
output level rather than its output prices. The alternative profit function employs the same 
dependent variable as the standard profit function and the same exogenous variables as 
the cost function. Thus, instead of counting deviations from optimal output as 
                                                 
7 Here and up to the end of this section reference is made to the parametric methods of efficiency estimation. 
For a thorough review of these concepts and a much more detailed discussion see Berger and Humphrey 
(1997). 
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inefficiency, variable output is held constant (as in the cost function) while output prices 
are free to vary and affect profits. Also, the alternative profit function provides a way of 
controlling for unmeasured differences in output quality, since it considers the additional 
revenue that higher quality output can generate. Still, the alternative profit efficiency 
concept may be apt in situations in which the firms exercise some market power in 
setting output prices. Under conditions of market power, it may be appropriate to 
consider output levels as relatively fixed in the short run and allow for efficiency 
differences in the setting of prices and service quality. Finally, the measurement of 
alternative profit efficiency may also be motivated by inaccuracies in the output price 
data. If prices were inaccurately measured, the predicted part of the standard profit 
function would explain less of the variance of profits and yield more error.  
To the best of our knowledge, only four studies analyze both profit and cost 
efficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997; Lozano, 1997; Rogers, 1998; Maudos et al., 2002) 
and not always to serve the purpose of result comparison. Consequently, the above 
discussion regarding the various efficiency concepts strongly motivates a comparison of 
the results obtained by the corresponding methodologies. 
 
3. Methodology 
To the extent that efficiency scores from various techniques contain different 
information, multiple sets of efficiency scores might be used as the basis for decision-
making. The efficiency scores derived from different methods could be assigned different 
weights based on how much information they convey to the decision maker. This 
possibility is the central notion of the information principle. Bauer et al. (1998) suggest 
that it is not necessary to have a consensus on which is the single best frontier approach 
for measuring efficiency, for the estimated efficiencies to be useful for regulatory 
analysis. Instead, they propose a set of consistency conditions that the efficiency 
measures derived from the various approaches should meet, so as to be more useful for 
regulators and other decision makers. Thus, the efficiency estimates should be consistent 
(1) in their efficiency levels, (2) rankings, and (3) identification of best and worst firms. 
They should also be consistent (4) over time and (5) with competitive conditions in the 
market, and finally (6) consistent with standard non-frontier measures of performance. It 
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could be argued that efficiency scores that satisfy these consistency conditions are more 
“informative” than those that do not. To examine these conditions we estimate the X-
efficiencies of a sample of 28 Greek banks over the period 1993 to 2005, using two very 
different (but widely applied in banking) methodologies. The stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA) with a composed error term (Aigner et al., 1977) and a linear programming cost 
frontier (DEA based on Färe et al., 1985).  The stochastic frontier technique is also 
extended to account for the cost and profit efficiency concepts, as discussed in the 
previous section. Note that the models’ choice rests on the intention to compare the most 
widely applied techniques of efficiency measurement in banking, rather than identifying 
the more robust or the most up-to-date methodologies.  
 
3.1 The Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
In the banking sector, econometric measurement of inefficiency has been 
undertaken mainly through estimating a cost function. The implementation of the profit 
function approach is rather difficult (even though probably more appropriate as discussed 
above) due to chronic data problems, as the profit function requires price data for outputs, 
which is hard to construct in banking.  
The SFA, as developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and applied to banking by Ferrier 
and Lovell (1990),8 specifies a particular form for the cost (profit) function, usually a 
translog form, and allows for random error. It assumes that these errors consist of 
inefficiencies, which follow an asymmetric distribution (usually a truncated or half 
normal distribution), and random errors that follow a symmetric distribution (usually the 
standard normal distribution).9 The reason for this particular structure of the composite 
error term is that, by definition, inefficiencies cannot be negative. Both the inefficiencies 
and random errors are assumed to be orthogonal to input prices, outputs and country-level 
or bank-specific variables specified in the estimating equation.   
According to the SFA, total cost assumes the following specification: 
( , , )it it it it it itTC f P Y Z v u= + +
                                                
               (1) 
 
8 Recent econometric developments are summarized in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000); Berger and Mester 
(1997) discuss applications to banking. 
9 The rationale for this is that inefficiency cannot lower cost and thus must have an asymmetric distribution, 
whereas random error can add or subtract cost and thus it can follow a symmetric distribution. 
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where TC denotes observed operating and financial cost for bank i at year t, P is a vector 
of input prices, Y is a vector of outputs of the bank, and Z stands for a set of control 
variables (fixed netputs). This approach disentangles the error term in two components. 
The first (v), corresponds to the random fluctuations, and is assumed to follow a 
symmetric normal distribution around the frontier, capturing all phenomena beyond the 
control of management. The second (u), accounts for bank’s inefficiency and is assumed 
here to follow a truncated normal distribution. 
The SFA to calculate cost efficiency is based on the following standard translog 
cost function10 : 
0
1 1ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2 2
1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2 2 2
1 ln ln
2
i i i i i ij i j ij i
i i i j i j
ij i j i i ij i j ij i j
i j i i j i j
ij i j it it
i
TC P Y P P Y Y
P Y Z Z Z Z Y
Z P T v u
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δ φ φ η
λ τ
= + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
∑
j
                                                
        (2) 
where T is a time trend, included in the equation to control for the effects of technical 
progress on bank costs.11 To ensure that the estimated cost frontier is well behaved, 
standard homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are imposed (see Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). 
We also use an alternative profit function specification, where the dependent 
variable is given by ln(π+k+1), and k indicates the absolute value of the minimum value 
of profit (π) over all banks in the sample, and is added to every firm’s dependent variable 
in the profit function. This transformation allows us to take the natural log of profits, 
given that profits can obtain negative values. Also, the composite error term is now 
defined as vit - uit. 
The general procedure for estimating cost inefficiency from Equation (2) is to 
estimate equation coefficients and the error term εit = uit + vit first, and then calculate 
 
10 We prefer the translog specification compared with the alternative Fourier-flexible functional form, since  
(i) most of the literature applies the translog and the purpose of this study is to compare widely used methods, 
and (ii) the Fourier requires additional truncations of data (Hasan and Marton, 2003). Moreover, Berger and 
Mester (1997) report that differences between the mean efficiency estimates of two procedures is very small.  
11 Because of sample size limitations, the time trend indicator T is not specified to interact with the outputs Yi 
and input prices Pj variables. Accordingly, only the impact of the neutral technical change on the cost function 
is considered in this paper, whereas the relevant impact, if any, of the non-neutral technical change is not 
identified. 
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efficiency for each observation in the sample. The cost frontier can be approximated by 
maximum likelihood, and efficiency levels are estimated using the regression errors. 
Jondrow et al. (1982), show that the variability, σ, can be used to measure a firm’s mean 
efficiency, where σ2 = σu2 + σv2. Bank-specific estimates of inefficiency terms can then be 
calculated by using the distribution of the inefficiency term conditional to the estimate of 
the composite error term. 
 
3.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
In their original paper, Charnes et al. (1978) proposed a model that had an input 
orientation and assumed constant returns to scale (CRS). The CRS assumption is only 
appropriate when all DMUs are operating at an optimal scale. However, factors like 
imperfect competition and constraints on finance may cause a DMU not to be operating 
at optimal scale. As a result, the use of the CRS specification may provide measures of 
technical efficiency, which are confounded by scale efficiencies. Therefore, the VRS 
specification (introduced by Banker et al., 1984) has been the most commonly used 
specification.12
In the input-orientated models, the DEA method seeks to identify technical 
inefficiency as a proportional reduction in input usage. It is also possible to measure 
technical inefficiency as a proportional increase in output production. These two 
measures provide the same value under CRS, but do not equate when VRS is assumed. 
The choice of orientation has both practical and theoretical implications. Many studies 
have tended to select input-orientated measures because the input quantities appear to be 
the primary decision variables, although this argument may not be valid in all industries. 
Other studies have pointed out that restricting attention to a particular orientation may 
neglect major sources of technical efficiency in the other direction (Berger et al., 1993). 
To date, the theoretical literature is inconclusive as to the best choice among the 
alternative orientations of measurement. In the present study, we evaluate cost 
inefficiency as a proportional reduction in input usage (input-orientation) following, once 
more, the majority of the literature. 
                                                 
12 In applying DEA, we followed the standard procedures outlined in Fare et al. (1994). Variable returns to 
scale were permitted through use of a side summation restriction in the linear programming. 
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To this end, we use the following input-oriented DEA model: 
*
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where DMU0 represents one of the n DMUs under evaluation, and xio and yro are the ith 
input and rth output for DMU0, respectively. Since θ = 1 is a feasible solution to (3), the 
optimal value to (3) is θ* ≤ 1. If θ* = 1, then the current input levels cannot be reduced 
(proportionally), indicating that DMU0 is on the frontier. Otherwise, if θ* < 1, then DMU0 
is dominated by the frontier. Thus, θ* represents the (input-oriented) efficiency score of 
DMU0. 
 
4. Greek commercial banks: Data and variables 
The dataset comprises financial statements of all commercial banks operating in 
Greece during the 1993–2005 period. As new banks entered the market and a number of 
mergers and acquisitions took place, our sample has an uneven number of banks each 
year. After reviewing the data for reporting errors and other inconsistencies, we obtain an 
unbalanced panel consisting of 244 bank-level observations. Overall, our sample 
accounts for a significant proportion of total banking assets (around 80 per cent). 13
The beginning of the examination period coincides with the acceleration of 
liberalization and deregulation of the Greek financial system, with the adoption of the 
Second Banking Directive, in view of the country joining the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). Indeed, the macroeconomic stabilization program, the liberalization of interest 
rate determination, the annulment of various credit rules, the release of capital 
                                                 
13 According to the Greek law governing the operation of corporations, foreign banks’ branches in Greece are 
not required to publish full-blown annual financial statements and thus are excluded from our sample. 
Moreover, specialized credit institutions are excluded from the analysis, as their operations differ substantially 
from those of commercial banks, while cooperative institutions are also excluded due to their small size and 
different legal form. 
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movements, the application in advanced information technologies, the 
internationalization of banking activities, the Euro circulation, and the phenomenon of 
disintermediation have triggered major structural changes in the Greek banking 
environment during the examined period, enhancing competition in both price and quality 
levels. Also, the examined period captures the new conditions that appeared in the 
banking industry in terms of organization, with banks moving towards the model of 
universal banking, with specialized subsidiaries providing the entire spectrum of financial 
services efficiently and flexibly, also taking advantage of the various synergies (Bank of 
Greece, 1999).  
The environment that emerged since 1993 led to the establishment of new credit 
institutions, either domestic or branches of foreign banks14. In addition, in order to adjust 
to new conditions and cope with the intensified competition, both domestically and cross-
border, several Greek banks involved into mergers and acquisitions since the mid 1990s, 
so as to become more efficient and obtain a size that would enable them to increase their 
market shares, facilitate their access to international financial markets and exploit any 
possible economies of scale (Kamberoglou et al., 2004). The observed wave of mergers 
and acquisitions, mostly between smaller banks (and also banks with non-banks), apart 
from the possible cost and efficiency gains was also motivated by the privatization 
process initiated by the government, in line with EU developments. Indeed, in the early 
1990’s, the state commercial banks controlled around 85 per cent of total commercial 
banking operations, while in the period 1995-2000, state-ownership fell by almost 20 
percentage points, from 72.3% in 1995 to 52.9% in 2000 (Kamberoglou et al., 2004). 
Mergers and acquisitions have resulted in higher concentration in the banking 
industry, as it is indicated by the rise in the market share of the top-5 banks, as a 
percentage of total assets, from 57% in 1995 to 65.6% in 2005. Although concentration in 
the Greek banking industry is much higher than the EU average, which stands at about 
40.5 % (ECB, 2005), this does not necessarily imply low competition. As evidenced by 
the reduction in interest rate spreads, especially in the segments of consumer and housing 
loans, in the past few years, which can only partly be attributed to convergence to the 
                                                 
14 Foreign presence was mainly concentrated in niche markets, specialized in areas such as shipping and 
corporate finance, private and personal banking, asset management, and capital market activities. 
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rates prevailing in the eurozone, competition has increased in the Greek banking system 
(Hondroyiannis et al. 1999). 
The aforementioned developments of the Greek banking system have obviously 
affected the structure of banks’ balance sheets and loss and profit accounts. Regarding 
banks’ income structure, interest revenues constitute banks’ main source of income, 
amounting to 75.3 % of total revenues in 2005, while, on the other hand, non-interest 
income is less that 16% of the total earnings (Bank of Greece, 2005). The efficiency 
levels of Greek banks, measured by simple accounting indicators, do not look fully 
adequate to international standards. In particular, the ratio of operating expenses to total 
assets stands at 2.1 percent in 2005, which is much higher than the average European 
figure. However, one can observe a clear downward trend in this ratio over the examined 
period, verifying the increasing efforts of Greek banks towards improving their efficiency 
by installing modern information technology systems, cutting their operating costs and 
improving their organizational structure, while they have extended their scope of business 
by offering new products and services.  
(Please insert table 1 about here) 
Table 1 describes the variables included in our models. For the definition of inputs 
and outputs, we adopt the intermediation approach proposed by Sealey and Lindley 
(1977).15 Total cost is defined as the sum of overheads (personnel and administrative 
expenses), interest, fee, and commission expenses. In the case of the profit function, we 
employ profit before tax. We specify two outputs, loans and other earning assets. Labor 
and borrowed funds are the input variables, whereas costs associated with these inputs are 
personnel expenses and interest expenses on funds, respectively. The price of funds is 
computed by dividing total interest expenses by total interest bearing borrowed funds, 
while the price of labor is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. We 
specify physical capital and equity as fixed netputs. The treatment of physical capital as a 
fixed input is relatively standard in efficiency estimation (Berger and Mester, 1997), 
                                                 
15A variety of approaches have been proposed in the literature, i.e. the production, the intermediation, the 
asset, the value-added and the user-cost approach. Yet, there is little agreement among economists on the 
explicit definition of banking outputs and inputs, mainly as a result of the nature and functions of financial 
intermediaries (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). 
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while the level of equity captures capitalization, insolvency risk and different risk 
preferences across banks.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Cost and profit efficiency based on the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
Cost and alternative profit inefficiency scores are obtained from the estimation of 
cost and profit frontiers as described above. Note that we truncated the extreme values 
from the estimated inefficiencies, in order to avoid biases attributable to estimation errors 
(see Maudos et al., 2002). Overall, the results (Table 2) suggest modest levels of cost 
inefficiency in the Greek banking industry, with the average throughout the period being 
0.164. However, Greek banks seem to be more efficient in controlling costs than in 
generating profits, as average profit inefficiency is much higher and stands at 0.553. This 
result could be partly justified by the existence of a fairly low level of intermediation 
depth compared with other EU countries. In addition, given the potential reward of 
expanding market shares, banks have little incentive to maximize profits by means of full 
utilization of their discretionary pricing power. Banks’ efforts to expand their activities 
led to restraining many resources, a strategy that only partly paid off, which in turn left 
profit efficiency trailing behind cost efficiency. Moreover, as interest margins have been 
kept at relatively high levels, banks may have faced less pressure to further increase 
profitability shifting their attention to control costs. The bank ranking under the profit 
efficiency approach differs from the respective cost efficiency ranking, which may imply 
a quality effect in the provision of intermediation services (banks with relatively high 
cost inefficiency offer better service quality and, thus, are able to generate higher profits).  
(Please insert table 2 about here) 
To identify additional, inter-industry sources of inefficiency we look into the effect 
of bank size and ownership (private vs. public). As regards the effect of bank size, we 
divide banks into two different categories on the basis of the size of their balance sheet 
aggregates. In particular, we distinguish between the five larger and the remaining banks 
of our sample (a bank is classified as ‘large’ if it holds total assets above €20 million in 
2005). The results (reported in Table 3) suggest that large-sized banks are slightly more 
cost efficient, obtaining an average inefficiency score of 0.153, compared to an average 
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inefficiency score of 0.173 for the rest. However, this picture is reversed under the profit 
efficiency approach, since small and medium-sized banks appear to be slightly more 
profit efficient. An explanation for this finding (even though the overall effect is not 
particularly significant) is that small banks may find it easier to engage in relationship 
lending than large banks. Furthermore, small banks may undertake risky loans (with 
higher returns during certain periods such as the one examined), in contrast to large 
banks, which usually avoid undertaking this type of loans regardless of the economic 
coincidence.  
(Please insert table 3 about here) 
Table 3 also reports average cost and profit inefficiency scores for banks with 
different ownership status.16 The results indicate that private banks are associated with 
slightly lower cost but higher profit efficiency. The relatively low cost efficiency of 
private banks certainly raises questions about the effectiveness of the initial liberalization 
policies. However, in the last few years, private banks’ operating costs have been 
declining and are now at almost the same level as those of the state-owned banks. The 
significantly higher profit efficiency of private banks highlights the importance of the 
revenue side, and thus the possible superiority of profit efficiency techniques in line with 
the discussion in Section 2. This finding also suggests that the ownership status is less 
important for cost efficiency than for profit efficiency.  
 
5.2 Cost efficiency based on parametric and non-parametric methods 
Following the consistency conditions of Bauer et al. (1998), in this subsection we 
use the same efficiency concept (cost inefficiency-technical inefficiency), the same 
sample of banks, the same time interval and the same specification of inputs and outputs. 
The sample period is characterized by many regulatory changes and many changes in 
market conditions, making it an almost ideal period to examine how the different frontier 
approaches measure bank inefficiency over a variety of extreme conditions. At this point 
we choose cost minimization over profit maximization because it is more commonly 
                                                 
16 Eichengreen and Gibson (2001) point out that public banks are different from private banks in a number of 
ways. They face softer budget constraints and their management is protected from hostile takeovers. Their 
loan portfolios and human resources management also differ, while they tend to manage their assets more 
inefficiently. 
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specified in the literature, and because of the notorious difficulties in measuring output 
prices in banking (an alternative profit efficiency scheme is not defined under non-
parametric techniques).17  
Given the above, we rerun the stochastic frontier model of Section 5.1, this time on 
two outputs and three inputs (instead of two outputs, two inputs and two netputs). Table 4 
presents the cost inefficiency estimates and the results suggest somewhat higher levels of 
inefficiency than the previous approach. Next we apply VRS DEA on the same panel 
dataset, using Program (3). The results of the exercise turned out to be robust to slight 
changes in the sample.18 A number of distributional characteristics of the inefficiency 
scores generated by the two efficiency techniques, SFA and DEA, are reported in Table 
4. The mean inefficiency from the SFA method is 19.5%, while the mean inefficiency 
from the DEA method is 36.1%. Hence, calculated programming inefficiency scores are 
almost double those derived from the SFA. The average standard deviation of parametric 
inefficiency estimates (0.193) is also lower than that of the non-parametric model 
(0.254). These results are consistent with the studies that compare bank inefficiency 
between parametric and non-parametric approaches. For example, Eisenbeis et al. (1999) 
found that calculated programming inefficiency scores of U.S. bank holding companies 
are two or three times larger than those estimated using a stochastic frontier. 
(Please insert table 4 about here) 
The year-by-year average efficiency scores derived from the two methods suggest 
DEA inefficiency estimates with significantly higher variability over time. In the 
beginning of the sample period DEA inefficiency is much higher than the respective 
stochastic frontier inefficiency, whilst at the end of the period DEA inefficiency is 8% 
lower. DEA also suggests a consistently downward trend in inefficiency, while the SFA 
posits that the downward trend is interrupted in 2002, and inefficiency corrects to higher 
levels thereafter. The beginning of the examination period coincides with the acceleration 
of liberalization of interest rates, and the deregulation of the Greek financial system, 
which started in the mid-1980s, and consequently the decline in cost inefficiency seems 
                                                 
17 Ideally, both cost and profit specifications would be employed and compared, but examining consistency 
conditions over the two techniques already seem to strain the very limits of theoretical identification. 
18 DEA is a deterministic technique and therefore is very sensitive to outliers. Hence, it is fundamental to 
check that solutions are stable, and do not vary dramatically when some units are excluded from the sample. 
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reasonable. The increase in inefficiency after 2002 also looks reasonable in light of the 
prolonged correction of the stock prices in the Greek market after the boom in the years 
1999-2000. Thus, the inefficiency trend under the parametric approach appears more 
reasonable. It is also noteworthy that the correlation between the estimates derived by the 
two methods is positive and quite significant (41%). This correlation is to a certain 
extend satisfactory, considering the wide differences in the engineering assumptions of 
the two methods. 
The results of the parametric approach are also aligned with what are generally 
believed to be the competitive conditions in the banking industry. The relatively low 
inefficiencies for the majority of banks under the SFA seem consistent with a reasonably 
competitive industry in a market that allowed entry. A potential explanation for this 
finding is the standard problematic feature of DEA. It does not account for random error. 
The dispersion from random error would likely result in higher average inefficiency. If a 
bank is simply very “lucky” and finds itself on the frontier, the rest will have very high 
measured inefficiency. 
The estimates of the levels of cost inefficiencies of the parametric and non-
parametric frontier methods are quite different across banks. The relatively high mean 
inefficiency for the DEA method is manifested in high inefficiencies for the majority of 
banks. In addition, the data suggests that DEA and the SFA give weakly consistent 
rankings with each other. Hence, DEA and the SFA cannot be relied upon to consistently 
rank the banks in the sample, as they may offer conflicting results when evaluating 
important regulatory questions. Also, this result reinforces the existing evidence, 
suggesting that the structure of the different models proves crucial for the computed 
inefficiency scores.  
Next, as in Section 5.1, we divide banks into 2 groups based on their size, in order to 
test whether DEA and the SFA offer similar insights regarding the effect of bank size on 
efficiency. Table 5 reports the average cost inefficiency results of the stochastic and 
programming frontier methodologies for banks of different size. The SFA results suggest 
that the top five banks are more cost efficient than the rest, with an average inefficiency 
score of 0.145 compared to 0.237 for small banks, indicating a positive relationship 
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between size and cost efficiency.19 DEA results yield the same conclusions. In particular, 
large banks obtain an average inefficiency score of 0.285, while small banks obtain an 
average inefficiency score of 0.392. 
(Please insert table 5 about here) 
Table 5 also reports the average cost inefficiency of the SFA and DEA when banks 
are grouped according to their ownership status. The SFA results suggest that state-
owned banks are more cost efficient than private banks with average inefficiency scores 
being 0.166 and 0.206, respectively. In contrast, DEA results are in line with theories 
suggesting that privately-owned financial institutions are ceteris paribus more efficient 
than the publicly-owned ones. Under this method, the reported average inefficiency 
scores are 0.343 and 0.410 for private and state-owned banks, respectively. Therefore, in 
this case, DEA may outperform the SFA. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The Greek banking sector provides an interesting context for studying bank 
efficiency, as it underwent significant changes during the last two decades. Since the mid 
1980s it was extensively liberalized through the abolition of administrative interventions 
and regulations, which seriously hampered its development. The reforms were adopted 
gradually and supported the further improvement of the institutional framework and the 
more efficient functioning of banks and financial markets in general. This has created a 
new, more competitive economic environment, within which the banking sector 
nowadays operates.  
 Along the lines of Bauer et al. (1998), we have argued that a comprehensive 
approach to bank efficiency measurement requires crosschecking between the different 
available techniques. To perform this task the present study proceeded in two stages. 
First, it analyzed both cost and alternative profit efficiency of the Greek banking system 
over the period 1993-2005, using the Stochastic Frontier Approach. Translog cost and 
profit functions were estimated, following the intermediation approach. Our findings 
showed lower levels of cost efficiency than profit efficiency, which is an expected result, 
                                                 
19 Note the strengthened significance of the effect of bank size compared to the effect identified in Section 5.1. 
This may suggest an important role for the categorization of the inputs as fixed and variable (see Berger et al., 
1993). 
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both measures reflecting an improving trend over the sample period. However, the 
difference between the levels of cost and profit efficiency is quite significant. Moreover, 
we analyzed the effect of size and of the ownership status (public vs. private) on the cost 
and profit measures of efficiency. Large-sized banks were found more cost efficient than 
their smaller counterparts, while an opposite result was established under profit 
efficiency. Furthermore, state-owned banks emerged as more cost efficient, while at the 
same time they were less profit efficient. All these results suggest an important role (at 
least in the Greek banking sector) for revenue efficiency, output quality and the market 
structure in determining bank efficiency, thus indicating that the profit efficiency 
approach provides a methodology more aligned with existing theoretical considerations. 
Second, we compared the results of the SFA method with those obtained by a non-
parametric approach, namely VRS-DEA. The results of the DEA exercise revealed higher 
average inefficiency than those of the SFA, which is an expected result given the fact that 
DEA is not stochastic. In fact, the average programming inefficiency scores almost doubled 
those of the SFA. Furthermore, inefficiency scores derived from the stochastic and 
programming frontiers appear to have gradually declined over the sample period, indicating 
a significant positive correlation between the yearly average scores of the two approaches. 
Both methods indicated that cost efficiency is positively related to bank size, while the 
findings regarding the effect of the ownership status were contradictory between the two 
approaches.  
In a nutshell, the results obtained from the various methods are substantially different. 
This may be attributed to the inner advantages and disadvantages of each approach, and 
leads to the conclusion that it is important to use more than one methodology to evaluate 
bank inefficiency. To phrase this differently, a more technically level playing field is 
required. Hence, the need to improve this study, would involve certain factors that are 
uncontrollable at this stage. We consider the most important extensions to be related to: (i) 
the effect of other bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants on 
efficiency; (ii) the consideration of the disentanglement of overall efficiency into its 
technical and allocative component; and (iii) the possible merging of parametric and non-
parametric methodologies so as to optimize the efficiency results. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and notation 
  
  Variable Definition Notation 
Total Cost Overheads +Interest expenses +Fee & commission expenses + 
Other operating expenses 
TC 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
(s
) 
Profit Profit before tax π 
Price of Labor Personnel expenses/ Total Assets P1
In
pu
t 
pr
ic
es
 
Price of Funds Interest expenses/ Total Funds P2
Loans Gross Loans Y1
O
ut
pu
ts
 
Other Earning Assets Investment Assets + Securities + Other Earning Assets Y2
Equity Equity Capital Z1
Fi
xe
d 
N
et
pu
ts
 
Physical Capital Fixed Assets Z2
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Table 2 
Basic results for cost and profit inefficiency  
  Cost inefficiency Profit inefficiency
Mean 0.164 0.553 
Standard deviation 0.100 0.216 
Minimum 0.033 0.206 
Maximum 0.746 0.948 
No. of obs  244 244 
Log likelihood function 75.55 -292.52 
Wald x2(21) (Prob> x2)  15,634 (0.000) 226.38 (0.000) 
Variances:                         σ(v) = 0.127 0.769 
σ(u) =  0.213 0.315 
σ=[(σ2(u)+σ2(v)] = 0.061 0.690 
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Table 3 
The effect of size and ownership on parametric cost and profit inefficiency 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Cost inefficiency
Bank size          
Large 0.153 0.021 0.053 0.281 65 
Small  0.173 0.113 0.033 0.746 179 
Ownership structure           
Government (state controlled) 0.152 0.086 0.074 0.564 68 
Domestic private 0.173 0.104 0.033 0.746 176 
Profit inefficiency
Bank size          
Large 0.566 0.239 0.285 0.931 65 
Small 0.535 0.204 0.206 0.948 179 
Ownership structure           
Government (state controlled) 0.674 0.172 0.366 0.931 68 
Domestic private 0.478 0.194 0.206 0.948 176 
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Table 4 
Parametric vs. non-parametric inefficiency over time  
Methodology DEA SFA   
Year Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
1993 0.380 0.285 0.276 0.247 22 
1994 0.447 0.259 0.275 0.301 23 
1995 0.459 0.273 0.195 0.166 22 
1996 0.503 0.263 0.163 0.138 23 
1997 0.498 0.248 0.175 0.222 22 
1998 0.478 0.215 0.223 0.217 20 
1999 0.380 0.228 0.186 0.177 18 
2000 0.392 0.210 0.173 0.167 14 
2001 0.319 0.144 0.172 0.179 14 
2002 0.231 0.152 0.145 0.142 17 
2003 0.172 0.139 0.151 0.105 17 
2004 0.132 0.124 0.164 0.106 16 
2005 0.100 0.132 0.179 0.161 16 
1993-2005 0.361 0.254 0.195 0.056 244 
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Table 5 
The effect of size and ownership on parametric and non-parametric cost inefficiency 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Bank size
SFA      
Large 0.145 0.037 0.034 0.403 65 
Small  0.237 0.202 0.025 0.034 179 
DEA      
Large 0.285 0.130 0.000 0.744 65 
Small 0.392 0.233 0.000 0.812 179 
Ownership structure      
SFA      
Government (state controlled) 0.166 0.180 0.039 0.989 68 
Domestic private 0.206 0.197 0.025 1.000 176 
DEA      
Government (state controlled) 0.410 0.271 0.000 0.791 68 
Domestic private 0.343 0.246 0.000 0.812 176 
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